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promptness in filing their amendment on December 30, 1953, 
after the parties had submitted arguments thereon, and prior 
to the trial herein. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, 
and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied Novem-
ber 23, 1955. 
[L. A. No. 23641. In Bank. Oct. 28, 1955.] 
FINANCIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY (a Corporation) 
et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COUR'I.' OF 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; F. BRITTON 
McCONNELL, as Insurance Commissioner, etc., Real 
Party in Interest. 
[1] Mandamus-Existence of Other Remedy.-A writ of mandate 
must be issued in all cases where there is not a plain, speedy 
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1086.) 
[2] Appeal-Right of A.ppeal.-An appeal is the usual course open 
to a litigant who believes that the trial court has committed 
error. 
[Sa, 3b] Mandamus-To Courts.-Where the court mistakenly dis-
poses of a matter before it on the ground that it has no juris-
diction and thereby precludes a decision on the merits, man-
damus will issue to compel it to assume jurisdiction and to 
decide the issues on the merits. 
[4] Judgments-Res Judicata-Decision on Merits.-A dismissal 
of a proceeding or a denial of relief on the sole ground of 
lack of jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits. 
[5] Insurance- Corporations- Insolvency- Powers of Commis-
sioner.-There is no implied restriction in the statute govern-
[1] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 17; Am.Jur., Mandamus, §50. 
[5] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Insurance,§ 169 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 15; [2] Appeal and 
Error, § 2; [3) Mandamus, § 37; [4] Judgments, § 350; [5, 6, 8, 
10, 14] Insurance. § 11.4; [7] Constitutional Law, ~ 177; [9, 11] 
Injunctiom;; ~ 19(2); [12] Iwmnmce, § 11.23; [131 16] Insurance, 
§ 11; (15] Insurance, §§ 11.23, 12. 
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pr•OCtledrni~S in case of insolvency of an insurance company 
et that the commissioner act only where 
existence of dangerous condition is beyond dispute. 
[6] Id.-Corpo:rations-Insolvency-Powers of Commissioner.-In 
his application for conservatorship of an insurance 
company, the commissioner does not seek a judicial appoint-
ment and a ruling that the company is in fact in-
solvent, and obtaining his original ex parte order he is not 
required to show to the court that the company was in fact in 
a hazardous condition, but only that he, as a state officer, in-
vested by legislative authority with the power, has so de-
termined and found. 
[7] Constitutional Law-Due Process-Notice and Hearing.-Al-
though the requirements of due process often involve a prior 
full hearing, where public necessity requires there can be 
action followed by a hearing. 
[8] Insurance- Corporations- Insolvency- Powers of Commis-
sioner.-The only requirement for judicial action on the 
commissioner's application for conservatorship of an insur-
ance company is his determination that he believes a hazardous 
condition exists which jeopardizes the future of the company, 
and on an application stating those facts the court "shall" 
issue the order for conservatorship, the statutory word "shall" 
as thus used being mandatory. 
[9] Injunctions - Matters Controllable - Official Duties. - Civ. 
Code, § 3423, subd. 4, and Code Civ. Proc., § 526, subd. 4, de-
claring that an injunction cannot be granted "to prevent the 
execution of a public statute, by officers of the law, for the 
public benefit," do not bar judicial action where the invalidity 
of the statute under which an officer is acting is shown, or 
where the officer exceeds his powers. 
[10] Insurance-Corporations-Insolvency-Powers of Commis-
sioner.-Ins. Code, §§ 1011, 1013, relating to proceedings in 
case of insolvency of an insurance company, are valid, and 
if the commissioner follows the statutory procedure and 
certifies that certain conditions exist, his action cannot be 
successfully challenged on the ground of excess of authority. 
[11] Injunctions-Matters Controllable-Official Duties.-Courts 
of equity have no power by injunction to restrain a public 
officer from performing an official act that he is required by 
valid law to perform. 
[12] Insurance-Corporations-Insolvency-Actions Against Com-
missioner.-A court is not vested with jurisdiction to issue 
an injunction by an allegation in the pleadings that the In-
surance Commissioner has abused his discretion or acted in 
bad faith. 
[13] '!d.-Corporations-Insolvency-Purpose of Statutes.-The 
primary purpose for the drastic remedy provided by Ins. Code, 
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1011, 1013, is to prevent dissipation of the assets of an in-
surance company after the commissioner has determined that 
a hazardous condition exists. 
[14] Id.-Corpm:ationn-Insolvency-Powers of Commissioner.-
To allow a court to delay conservatorship of an insura!lc( 
company while it determines the motives of the commissioner 
would as effectively defeat the purpose of Ins. Code, §§ 1011, 
1013, as to postpone the conservatorship while the existence 
or nonexistence of the hazardous condition is judicially estab-
lished. (Disapproving any dictum in Rhode Island Ins. Co. 
v. Downey, 95 Cal.App.2d 220, 212 P.2d 965, to the contrary.) 
[15] !d.-Corporations-Insolvency-Legislative Intent: Injunc-
tions.-The Insuranee Code indicates a legislative intent to 
create a system to protect the public interest in insurance 
companies which may have become insolvent, and the issuance 
of an injunction against the commissioner, who has filed an 
application for conservatorship of sneh a company, would de-
feat the purpose of such statutes. 
[16] Id. -Corporations- Insolvency- Legislative Intent. - The 
Legislature has determined that possible irreparable injury 
to an insurance company because of conservatorship must be 
subordinated to the public interest. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County to hear an order to show cause why 
the Insurance Commissioner should not be restrained from 
taking over and conducting the business of an insurance com-
pany. Demurrers to petition for writ of mandate sustained. 
and order to show cause vacated; application for leave to pro-
duce additional evidence denied. 
John S. Bolton, Wright, Wright, Green & Wright, Loyd 
Wright and Dudley K. Wright for Petitioners. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and William E. 
J_;amoreaux, Deputy County Counsel for Respondent. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Everett W. Mat-
toon, Assistant Attorney General, and Lee B. Stanton, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Real Party in Interest. 
EDMONDS, J.-G. Kenneth Vaughn is the owner of all 
of the outstanding capital stock of Financial Indemnity Com-
pany, a California corporation licensed to do business as an 
insurer in this state. The company and Vaughn commenced 
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an action in the superior court seeking declaratory relief and 
an injunction to prevent the Insurance Commissioner from 
taking over the assets of the corporation. As ground for 
justifying judicial interference with the purpose of the Insur-
ance Commissioner, it is alleged that the condition of the 
company does not come within the statutory conditions allow-
ing him to take charge of its affairs. 
On the day after that action was commenced, the com-
missioner pr~sented in open court an application for con-
servatorship pursuant to the provisions of section 1011 of 
the Insurance Code.1 Vaughn and the company requested 
the court to issue an order to show cause and a temporary 
restraining order to enjoin the commissioner from filing his 
application. The court refused to do so, upon the ground 
that "it does not have any jurisdiction in such matters until 
the commissioner files a petition under section 1011 or sum-
marily seizes the company under section 10132 • • • If the 
court issued an injunction herein it would . . . [usurp] the 
discretion exclusively vested in the commissioner to determine 
and find, in the first instance, whether or not conditions justi-
fying seizure existed.'' 
Vaughn and the company then filed in the District Court 
of Appeal the present proceeding in mandamus. That court 
ordered the superior court to show cause why a writ of 
mandate should not issue requiring the court to proceed to 
a hearing and determination of the action for declaratory 
relief and injunction. It also provided that "pending the 
hearing of such order to show cause, you are directed to take 
no action calculated to affect the pendency of said cause except 
to proceed with the trial thereof.'' 
The Insurance Commissioner, as the real party in interest, 
noticed a motion to vacate the order to show cause, or for 
modification of it, by deleting the portion which prohibited 
'Section 1011 : ''The superior court . . . shall, upon the filing of 
the commissioner of the verified application showing any of the following 
conditions hereinafter enumerated to exist, issue its order vesting title 
to all of the assets of such person, wheresoever situated, in the com-
missioner . ... '' 
"Section 1013: ''Whenever it appears to the commissioner that any 
of the condition~ set forth in section lOll exist or that irreparable loss 
and injury to the property and business of a person specified in section 
1010 has occurred or may occur unless the commissioner so act imme-
diately, the commissioner, without notice and before applying to the court 
for any order, forthwith shall take possession of the property, business, 
books, records and accounts of such person, and of the offices and premises 
••• and retain possession subject to the order of the court •••• " 
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him from filing an application for conservatorship pending 
the hearing. He also filed a return by way of demurrer, 
alleging that the petition for mandamus does not state a cause 
of action because the court has no jurisdiction over the 
respondent superior court, or the subject matter of the peti-
tion. By ans·wer, the commissioner denies specifically and 
generally each and every allegation except those pertaining 
to the corporate status of the company. Vaughn's stock in-
terest, the pendency of the action in the superior court and 
its refusal to act in the matter. As an affirmaive defense, 
he attacks the petition upon the same grounds presented by 
the demurrer. The superior court demurred to the petition 
upon the grounds that it does not state facts sufficient to 
entitle the petitioners to the remedy sought. 
Vaughn and the company contend that the commissioner 
is attempting to apply sections lOll and 1013 of the Insurance 
Code in an unconstitutional manner, in that he threatens 
to take over the company for reasons not specified by 
the statute. Such action, the argument continues. would de-
prive the petitioners of their property rights without due 
process of law. The position of the commissioner and the 
respondent court is that the writ should be denied because 
(1) the superior court has passed on the matter and its order 
is appealable; (2) the pendency of an action for declaratory 
relief and an injunction does not enlarge the jurisdiction 
of the court nor bar the commissioner from acting pursuant 
to section 1011 of the Insurance Code; (3) when an applica-
tion is filed by the commissioner pursuant to statute, it is 
the mandatory duty of the respondent court to issue a vesting 
order; and ( 4) the courts have no jurisdiction to enjoin state 
officers from the execution of constitutional statutes for the 
public benefit. 
(1] Section 1086 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides 
that the writ of mandate "must be issued in all cases where 
there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the 
ordinary course of law." [2] "An appeal is the usual 
course open to a litigant who believes that the trial court has 
committed error." (Phe7an v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 
363, 366 [217 P.2d 951].) [3a] However, where the court 
disposes of a matter before it upon the ground that it has 
no jurisdiction, and thereby precludes a decision on the 
merits, mandamus has been issued to compel the court to 
decide the issues upon the merits. (See Cahill v. Superior 
Court, 145 Cal. 42 [78 P. 467] ; Tirnes-JJf.irror Co. v. Superior 
400 Pr:\A'-:CIAL f:<:DE1I Co. v. SrPEIUOR CmJRT [45 C.2d 
Court, 3 Cal.2d 30!:1 P.2d 547 J ; Levy v. Superwr Court, 
15 Cal.2d 692 [104 P.2d 770, 129 A.L.R. 956].) [4] A dis-
missal of a proceeding or a denial of relief on the sole 
ground of lack of jurisdiction is not a decision on the merits. 
(See Hogeberg v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 201 Cal. 169, 182-183 
[256 P. 413] ; Helvey v. Castles, 73 Cal.App.2d 667, 672 
[167 P.2d .J [3b] And in ](atenkamp v. Superior Court, 
16 Cal.2d 696 at page 698 [108 P.2d 1], the court said, "If 
a court is mistaken in its assumption that it does not possess 
the requisite jurisdiction, mandamus will issue to compel it 
to assume jurisdiction.'' 
The trial court's refusal to issue the requested order to 
show cause and temporary restraining order was based 
squarely upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The decisive 
question, therefore, in the pn•sent proceeding is whether, upon 
any theory reasonably to be drawn from the facts stated in 
the complaint of Vaughn and the company, the commissioner 
may be enjoined from filing an application for conserva-
torship. 
The purpose of Vaughn and the company is to have the 
issue of whether grounds for conservatorship exist determined 
before the commissioner is allowed to take over the company. 
They assert that if the conditions provided by statute as 
grounds for taking over the business of an insurer do not 
exist, an order allowing the commissioner to do so would 
amount to an application of the provisions of the Insurance 
Code against them in an unconstitutional manner. This argu-
ment assumes that any error in judgment by the commissioner 
would be a violation of constitutional rights. [5] But as 
was said in Rhode Island Ins. Co. v. Downey, 95 Cai.App.2d 
220, 230-231 [212 P.2d 965], "It is not a requirement of the 
statute ... , that such matters not be disputable. The Legis-
lature undoubtedly assumed that in most cases the company 
involved would dispute the commissioner's contentions, and 
accordingly provided. in section 10123 for a full hearing 
before the trial court, at which the company could show that 
the conditions claimed by the commissioner did not exist. 
There is no implied restriction in the statute that the com-
'Section 1012: ''Said order shall continue in force and effect until, 
on the application of either of the commissioner or of such person, it 
shall, after a full hearing, appear to said court that the ground for said 
order directing the commissioner to take title and possession does not 
exist or has be(•n removed and thnt said person can properly resume 
title and possession of its property and the conduct of its business.'' 
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missioner act only where the existence of the dangerous 
condition is beyond dispute.'' 
In the Rhode Island case the commissioner obtained an 
order appointing him conservator. The company sought a 
writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate the 
order, contending, among other points, that the facts did 
not justify the commissioner's action. [6] The court re-
fused to issue the writ, saying, ''The statute, as construed 
by the California courts, requires only that the commissioner 
file a verified application stating that he has found one, or 
more. of the statutory grounds to exist. 'In making his 
application under section 1011 of the Insurance Code, the 
commiss1oner does not seek a judicial appointment and a 
judicial ruling that the company is in fact delinq1tent. By 
his application the commissioner merely represents that he 
has found certain conditions to exist and has made his official 
administrative determination to proceed as authorized by the 
statute. In obtaining his original ex parte order, the com-
missioner is not required to show to the court that the com-
pany was in fact in a hazardous condition, but only that he, 
as a state officer, invested by legislative authority with the 
power, has so "determined" and "found."' (Caminetti v. Im-
perial Mut. L. Ins. Co., 59 Cal.App.2d 476, 487 [139 P.2d 
681] ... ; emphasis added.)" (Pp. 230, 231.) 
The court not only concluded that the issues must be heard 
in a proceeding brought pursuant to section 1012 but also 
held that an order made in accordance with its provisions is 
not a deprivation of due process. [7] ''Although the require-
ments of due process often involve a prior full hearing, it 
has long been recognized that where public necessity requires, 
there can be action followed by a hearing .... " (P. 235.) 
(Also see Carpenter v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 
2d 307, 324 [74 P.2d 761]; State Savings etc. Bank v. Ander-
son, 165 Cal. 437 [132 P. 755, hR.A. 1915E 65]; North 
American Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Richardson, 6 Cal.2d 90 r56 
P.2d 1221].) "It must be remembered that insurance 
companies, like banks and building and loan companies, are 
charged with a public interest, and hence, the price of doing 
business is the fact that whenever a condition exists which 
the insurance commissioner feels is hazardous, he may take 
over the company and the question of whether he was justified 
in doing so is thereafter threshed out." (P. 233.) 
The I1egislature has provided a procedure by which the 
public interest in insurance companies may be protected. 
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[8] The only requirement for judicial action upon the 
application of the commissioner is his determination that he 
believes a hazardous condition exists which jeopardizes the 
future of the company. Upon an application stating those 
facts, the code provides Hwt the court ''shall '' issue the 
order for conservatorship. The wore! "shall" as used in the 
Insurance Code, is mandatory. ( § 16.) 
[9] Section 3423, subdivision 4, of the Civil Code and 
also section 526, subdivision 4, of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provide that an injunction canuot be granted ''to 
preyeut the execution of a public statute, by officers of the 
law, for the public benefit." Thes•: sections do not bar judicial 
action where th1• invalidity of tbe statute under whieh he is 
acting is shown (Reclamation Dlst. No. 1500 v. Superior 
Court, 171 Cal. G72 [154 P. 8451) or when the offieer exeeeds 
his powers. (Cowell v. Martin, 43 CaL 605.) [10] How-
ever, sections 1011 and 1013 of the Insurance Code haYe been 
upheld as valid (Rhode Island Ins. Co. v. Downey, 95 CaL 
App.2cl 220 [212 P.2d 965] ), and if the commiRsioner fol-
lows the statutory procedure and certifies that ecr1 a in con-
ditions exist, his action cannot be successfully challenged 
on the ground of excess of authority. 
[11] In Southern Oregon Co. v. ()uine, 70 Ore. G3 [139 
P. 332], the court said, "We think the law is fixed, beyond 
cavil, that courts of equity have no power by ll1Jltndion to 
restrain a public officer from pcrformi11g an official act that 
he is required by valid law to perform. It is not sufficient 
to clothe the ('OUrt with jnrisdietion to say simply that, un-
less the court extends its restraining hand, hardships 1Yill 
follo\Y, or irreparable damage will enwe, because the officer 
(lelegated to execute such law may act umYisely or injuriously 
to the party seeking relief. The acts must be such as are with-
out the sanction of a sound law." This statement has been 
quoted with approval by the courts of this state. (See 
Reclamation Dist. No. 1500 v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 672 
[154 P. 845]; Loftis v. Superior Court, 25 Cai.App.2d 346, 
353 [77 P.2d 491] .) 
[12] A court is not vested with jurisdiction to issue an 
injunction by an allegation i11 the pleadings that the com-
missioner has abused his discretion or acted in bad faith. 
[13] The primary pL1rpose for the drastic remedy provided 
by sections 1011 and 1013 of the Insurance Code is to pre-
vent dissipation of the aRsets of the company after the com-
missioner has determined that a hazardous condition exists. 
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[14] To allow a court to delay conservatorship while it de-
termines the motives of the commissioner would as effectively 
defeat that purpose as to postpone the conservatorship while 
the existence or nonexistence of the hazardous condition is 
judicially established. Any dictum in the Rhode Island case 
to the contrary is disapproved. 
In Modern Barber Colleges, Inc. v. Cal1fornia Emp. Stab. 
Com., 31 CaL2d 720 [192 P.2d 916], this court refused to 
compel, by writ of mandate, the cancellation of charges made 
against the petitioner for amounts assertedly due under the 
Unemployment Insurance Act. It was held that judicial review 
of the collection may be had only after payment under protest. 
That act provides that no injunction or writ of mandate shall 
issue to prevent or enjoin the collection of contributions. 
In upholding the statute, the court said, "If proceedings 
which halt the collection of the tax were allowed to be 
brought before the payments are made, the povver would be 
placed in the hands of employers to so delay the creation 
of the fund as to frustrate the purposes of the act. It has 
been expressly declared by this court that these purposes 
are of great public importance, and that procedural obstacles 
which would delay or prevent their fulfillment are to be 
avoided." (P. 732.) 
[15] The Insurance Code clearly indicates a legislative 
intent to create a system to protect the public interest in 
iusuranee companies. The issuance of an injunction would 
defeat the purpose of such statutes. (See Moore v. S1tperior 
Court, 6 CaL2d 421, 424 [57 P.2d 1314].) [16] The Legis-
lature has determined that possible irreparable injury to the 
company must be subordinated to the public interest. (See 
Rhode Island ins. Co. v. Downey, 95 CaLApp.2d 220 [212 
P.2d D65]; North American Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Richard-
son, 6 CaL2d 90 [56 P.2d 1221]; State Savings etc. Bank v. 
Anderson, 165 Cal. 437 [132 P. 755, L.R.A. 1915E 65].) 
'rhe petitioners have filed an application for leave to pre-
sent additional evidence. They claim that an examination 
of the company's financial condition, recently completed by 
the Insurance Commissioner, shows that it is solvent. They 
do not state the purpose for which the evidence is offered. 
but apparently it is in support of their position that the con-
templated application by the commissioner for an order 
authorizing him to conduct the business as conservator is 
not to be :made upon statutory grounds. 
For the reasons which have been stated, the petition for 
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mandate presents no tenable for judicial interfer-
ence with the exercise of the eommissioner 's official duty. 
Although after an order has been made upon sueb an appli-
eation, evidence of the insurer's solveney would be relevant 
in a hearing condneted pursuant to section ] 012 of the In-
snrance Code, it has 110 bearing upon the issue in the present 
proceeding. Upon the record before him. the trial judge 
was correct m the eonclusion that the court was without 
jul'isdiction to enjoin the commissioner from making sneh 
a ppl ieation. 
'l'he applieation for leave to prodnee additional evidenee 
is denier1. The demnrrers to the petition for a writ of man-
date are snstained. and the order to show ranse is varated. 
Gibson, C. J ., Shenk, J ., 'l'raynor, J ., and Spcnee, J ., con-
curred. 
CAH'fER, J.-I dissent. 
'I'he majority opinion holds that the superior eonrt has 
no jurisdietion in an aetion whieb seeks deelaratory r·elief 
and an mjnnction ag·ainst the Insurance Commissioner who. 
it is charged, is th1·eatening to abusP and exceed his statutory 
power with respeet to assuming coutrol over plaintiff in-
surance company pnq)()rtedly be(•ans<· it is in an tmstable 
financial condition. ft is pointed out that the eommission 
may seize a company if ePrtain 1:onditiom; exist either with 
or without a proeeeding in court. (lm; Cock § ~ 10]], 1013.) 
In the action of which the majority says the superior court 
did not have jnrisdietion, the plaintiff alleges in its complaint 
ample facts to give the court jnrisdietion. The eomplaint 
must be aeeepted as true as the question involved is solely 
whether the action is one in whieh the eourt has jnrisrlietion. 
It is allegwl that the fnsnranee Commissioner has been in-
vestigating plaintiff sinee its organization and has claimed 
that plaintiff Va nghn is not a proper person to hold the 
sto(ok of the plaintiff' and that it was insolvent: that plaintiff 
is solvent:* that during the (•ommiRsioner's investigation, 
his subordinates ''exhibited an "xtreme personal animosity 
to offieers, dirf•etors. employees and eonnsel for plaintiff 
and both the financial reports and the reports on the con-
ditions of the company haYe been motivated by bias and 
prejudiee, and a desire to aceomplish the removal of G. Ken-
neth Vaug·hn and his family from thr insnranre business"; 
* lt off<1r~ evidence here to show beyond doubt that it was and is solvent. 
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that as a result of the aetion of the eommissioner and his 
subordinates and the threat to take the specified action ir-
reparable injury has rPsulted and will result, that a new and 
unimJlC'at:hable board of directors for plaintiff has been elected 
and .. Then' is not. and there is no elaim by defendants that 
there is. any hazardous eoml itions in the management of 
plaintiff company nndcr present management: no member of 
the \raughn family hal' any control in the management or 
eonduet of the business of said company 
· "rhe financial condition of ~aid plaintiff company is ex-
et•eding!y strong and its net earnings and policy holders' 
surplus have. and are. increasing snbstantially, and the de-
fendants do not and eannot make any claim that the company 
is not now in a sound financial condition ancl solvent within 
the meanillg of the Insurance Code. There is uo claim that 
the public-, polic-yholders, or creditors are or will he exposed 
to any detriment. . 
"Ddendant~"; herein have never afforded to plaintiffs an 
opportunity to presPnt their case• before an impartial tribunal. 
either administrative or judicial, and have never issued any 
ruJ ing or order directing plaintiffs to comply with or correct 
any alleged noncomplianc-e with any provision of the In-
surancP Code.'' 
The authorities are c~lear that a perso11 may have declaratory 
relief and injnnetive relief against a public nffieer when 
sueh officer'~ aets will cam;e him to be deprived of eon-
stitutional rights, or whell the officer is aeting arbitrarily 
and outside the scope of t he• powers given to him by statute 
when such action will eause irreparable harm to the person. 
In Brock v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.2d 682 rs1 P.2rl !J31 J, 
petitioner. the State Direc:tor of Agriculture. sought prohibi-
tion to restrain the trial in an action by plaint.iffs against 
defendant director to have him rPstrained from enfore.ing 
the milk eontrol act beeanse he had failed to follow the law 
establishing the milk control area. This court denied pro-
hibition and found that the trial <"onrt harl jurisdietion nf 
the action. We stated (page 684) : "Tn support of their 
demand for an injunc-tion again:;t th(" director of agrieulture, 
tlte plaintiffs allege that the direetor of agriculture failed 
to comply with the provisions of the Milk Control Act in 
the formation of said area and in the establishment of the 
amended Stabilization and Marketing Plan for the sale of 
milk and <:ream within said area. 
" •.. The defendant in said action, the director of agri-
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culture, was present both upon the application for a re-
straining order, and at the hearing of the order to show 
cause why a temporary injunction should not issue. Hi, 
contention on these occasions, and his contention now, is that 
the Milk Control Act is presumed to be valid, and that the 
defendant as a public officer is presumed to have regularly 
performed his official duty in the organization of said area 
and in the establishing of said stabilization and marketing 
plan, and, therefore, no injunction may be issued to prevent 
the execution of said statute by him as such public officer 
without the establishment, after due hearing, of the invalidity 
of his acts, and that until such hearing and the final deter-
mination that his acts are illegal, tht- courts are without 
jurisdiction to issue an injunction restraining him from 
attempting to enforce the statute .... 
"Petitioner relies upon section 526 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure and section 8423 of the Civil Code. The fourth 
subdivision of each of these sections provides that an in-
junction will not lie to prevent the execution of a public 
statute by an officer of the law for the public benefit. But 
petitioner concedes, as we understand his position, that if it 
be determined after a trial that the officer is acting illegally, 
then it is within the power of the court to restrain his acts. 
These code sections therefore do not answer our present 
inquiry. 
''. . . The case before the trial court in that instance was 
precisely like that involved in a recent case decided by this 
court where we held that as there were issues of fact tendered 
by the complaint in an injunctive proceeding, the trial court 
had jurisdiction to try these issues of fact, and that prohibition 
would not lie to restrain the trial court from issuing an 
injunction against an officer in an attempt to enforce a public 
statute, until these issues of fact were determined. (Ag1·i-
cnltuml Prorate Com. v. Superior C01trt, 5 Cal.2d 550 [55 
P.2d 495] .) In that case our decision upon this point is as 
follows : 'In the injunction suit before the respondent court 
the plaintiffs therein made the claim that the prorate district 
in which the applicants were purporting to act as officers 
was never legally formed or organized in that the petition 
for the formation of said district was never signed by the 
necessary two-thirds of the lemon producers residing in said 
proposed district or zone, and therefore the commission had 
no authority to make its orC!er n9,· said district wii·hout 
an election being held therein to pass upon the question of 
Oct. Frr-.TANOIAL INmnr. Co. v. SuPERIOR CouRT 407 
45 C .2d 305: 2B9 P .2d 233: 
the formation of said clistriet. This e!aim on the part of said 
plaintiffs was set forth in parngTapb XX of their complaint 
in whieh it is alleged among other things that "said petition 
was not by two-thirds or more in numbC'r of the pro-
clneers of lemons in California, nor by the owners of two-
thirds or more of the producing faetors of lemons in Cali-
fornia.'' If that allegation is true, then the district was not 
legally formed or organized, and if it was not so organized, 
an injunction against the applicants restraining them from 
exeeuting the terms of said act would lie. On the hearing 
of the applieation for a temporary injunetion, an affidavit 
was filed whieh purported to deny the allegations of para-
graph XX of the said complaint. TherC' is nothing, however, 
in the reeord before us to indicate that the respondent eourt 
has ever passed upon the issue tendered by the allegations 
oi' said paragraph XX. In faet, it would be rather unusual 
for the court to finally pass upon an issue of fact on an 
applieation for a temporary injunetion This issue of faet, 
however, was presented by the plaintiffs in the injunetion 
suit and the court had jurisdiction to deeide it. So far it 
has never done so. The injunetion suit is still in the re-
spondent eourt, and the court has exclusive jurisdietion to 
hear and determine all undeeided issues of faets presented by 
the pleadings in such suit. Should it determine that said 
distriet was legally organized and that th(~ orders whieh the 
plaintiffs in said action seek to restrain are valid and binding 
upon those to whom they are directed, then it would be the 
duty of said court to deny the injunetion and dismiss the 
suit. On the other hand, shonld the trial eourt find in favor 
of the plaintiffs in said suit upon the allegations of said 
paragraph XX, then it would necessarily follow that said 
orders would have no legal support and the defendants in said 
f>Uit should b<' enjoined from enforcing them. For this reason 
the applieation for a \vTit of prohibition direeted to respond-
ents restraining them from proceeding in said action should 
be denied.' 
'' \V e see no reason to recede from the position taken in 
the deeision of that case. It appears to us to be the only 
reasonable conclusion that ean be reached in proeeedings of 
that Hature. To hold otherwise would be to tie the hands of 
the conrt in cases in which great and irreparable injury 
might be done private citizens by officers acting under a mis-
takrn of their authority." 
'l'he same holding prevailed in Brock v. Superior Court, 
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12 Cal.2d 605 [86 P.2d 805]; Agr'iC1llttlral Prorate Com. v. 
Superior Court, 5 CaL2d 550 [55 P.2d 495]; and Agricultural 
Prorate Com. v. Stlperior Co11rt, 31 Cal.App.2d 518 r88 P.2d 
25:3]. In the latter case (at p. 523). the court said: "The 
second point, that the order of the respondent court violated 
certain code provisions. is not well taken. for if the officers 
were in fact acting illegally, it is, as held in the foregoing ea;;;e, 
within the power of the court to restrain their acts. . . . 
'' 'To hold otherwise would be to tie the hands of the court 
in cases in which great and irreparable injury might be 
done private citizens by officers acting under a mistaken 
belief of their authority.' " (Brock v. Sttperior Cmtrt, supra, 
11 Cal.2d 682.) 
Similarly, in the instant case the superior court had juris-
diction to determine whether the commissioner's threatened 
action was illegal. There can be no doubt that the injury to 
plaintiff insurance company will be irreparable if it is taken 
over by the commissioner. Its eredit and standing will be 
seriously impaired. 
The majority opinion states that plaintiff has its relief by 
an attack on the seizure after it has been accomplished (Ins. 
Code, § 1012) and that that remedy is exclusive. There is 
nothing in the Insurance Code which makes it the exclusive 
remedy as there was in the case of Modern Barber Colleges, 
Inc. v. California Emp. Stab. Com., 31 Cal.2d 720 [192 P.2d 
916], relied upon by the majority. It must be remembered 
that plaintiff's action was for declaratory, as well as injunc-
tive, relief and, furthermore, we held in California Physicians' 
Service v. Garrison, 28 Cal.2d 790, 801 [172 P.2d 4, 167 
A.L.R. 306], that "section 1062 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
expressly provides that the remedy through declaratory relief 
is cumulative and not restrictive of any other remedy pro-
vided by law.'' The court was there speaking of an action 
wherein plaintiff sought to have the court declare that the 
Insurance Code did not apply to its membrrs' bnsinrss. 
I would, therefore, grant the writ of mandate prayed for 
herein. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Petitioners' application for a rehearing was dE'nied Novem-
ber· 23, 1955. Cartrr, ,J., and Schauer, ,J., were of the opinion 
that the application should be granted. 
